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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the protability of horizontal mergers of rms with
price adjustments. We take a di¤erential game approach and both the open-loop as
well as the closed-loop equlibria are considered. We show that the merger incentive
is determined by how fast the price adapts to the equilibrium level.
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1 Introduction
When quantity-setting rms compete in a homogenous product industry with symmetric
cost and the same demand functions, horizontal merger is modelized as an exogenous
change in market structure. As a result, the level of competition decreases which increases
the market price and market power of rms as well. In the case of linear demand and cost
functions, the resulting anticompetitive forces are mostly to the benet of outsiders and
mergers are advantageous to the merging rm just in the circumstance that market share
of merging rm is extremely high, at least 80% which is almost merging to a monopoly
(Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983 (henceforth SSR); Gaudet and Salant, 1991, 1992).
Keeping everything the same, this threshold will be reduced to 50% (which is again a
considerable market share) provided that the merged entity is not restricted to remain a
Cournot player after the merger (Levin, 1990) or any demand function which satises the
second-order conditions is allowed (Cheung, 1992). There are other studies showing that
mergers are privately protable if they are leader-generating (in industries where about less
than one-third of the rms are leaders) (Daughety, 1990), or if merger generates synergies
(Perry and Porter, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). However, the incentive to merge
always exists once price is employed as the strategic variable rather than quantity. In a
di¤erentiated product industry, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) demonstrate that mergers
of any size are benecial if rms are engaged in a price-setting game.
We want to conduct an investigation into the consequences of horizontal mergers in
oligopoly Cournot competition in the presence of price stickiness. When prices are sticky,
for a given level of output the actual market price of a product does not adjust instan-
taneously to the price indicated by its demand function and price adjustment takes time.
Since prices evolve over time we need a dynamic framework to investigate the e¤ect of
price stickiness on the protability of horizontal mergers.
Using an oligopolistic di¤erential game model with sticky prices in the specic case of
instantaneous price adjustment, Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2001) through a numerical
analysis show that, contrary to the static game, in a dynamic Cournot game where rms use
feedback strategies mergers are always protable independently of the number of merging
rms. Their result suggests that to analyzing merger, it is important to consider the
nature of competition in the industry. Besides focusing on the same issue analytically,
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Benchekroun (2003) shows that when rms use open-loop strategies merger is protable
only if the market share of the merged rm is signicant enough, very similar to the SSR
results, which put more emphasis on the role of feedback strategies to create incentive to
merge.
In this paper, we take a general approach without introducing specic assumptions on
the degree of price stickiness to investigate the bearings of price dynamics. Scale economies
as a motive for merger is ruled out by assumption because we would like to concentrate
on the incentives to merge that are generated by price dynamics. To this end, we take a
di¤erential game approach to price dynamics introduced by Simaan and Takayama (1978)
and Fershtman and Kamien (1987). We take into consideration both the open-loop and
closed-loop (memoryless)1 equilibria to investigate how the speed of adjustment can a¤ect
the protability of horizontally merged rms. There emerges, when price adjust with a very
sticky mechanism, mergers with a small number of insiders but large number of outsiders
are also privately protable even if rms play open-loop. Furthermore, by guring out the
least market share required for merger to be protable when price adjusts instantaneously,
we revisit the closed-loop e¤ect to generate incentive to merge.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the layout of
the model. Sections 3 illustrate the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria. The assessment
of incentives towards mergers is given in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The setup
Consider a dynamic oligopoly market where n symmetric rms, at any t 2 [0;1), pro-
duce quantities qi(t)  0; i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng ; of the same homogeneous good with concave
1Broadly speaking, the main di¤erence between the open-loop equilibrium on one hand and the feedback
and closed-loop equilibria on the other is that the former does not take into account strategic interaction
between players through the evolution of state variables over time and the associated adjustment in
controls. Under the open-loop rule, players choose their respective plans at the initial date and commit to
them forever. Therefore, in general, open-loop equilibria are not subgame perfect, in that they are only
weakly time consistent since players make their action by the clockonly.
A further distinction can be made between the closed-loop equilibrium and the feedback equilibrium,
which are both strongly time consistent and, therefore, subgame perfect since, at any date  , players
decide by the stockof all state variables. However, while the closed-loop memoryless equilibrium takes
into account the initial and current levels of all state variables, the feedback equilibrium accounts for
the accumulated stock of each state variable at the current date. Hence, the feedback equilibrium is a
closed-loop equilibrium, while the opposite is not true in general [2].
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technologies described by the quadratic cost functions
Ci (t) = cqi(t) +
1
2
q2i (t); c > 0: (1)
In each period, the product price, p^(t), is determined by means of the inverse demand
function
p^(t) = A 
nX
i=1
qi(t): (2)
However, since price is sticky, the actual market price does not adjust instantaneously to
the price given by the demand function. That is, p^(t) will di¤er from the current price
level, p(t), and price moves according to the following equation
dp(t)
dt
 _p(t) = s fp^(t)  p(t)g ; (3)
where s 2 [0;1) is a constant that determines the speed of price adjustment. The lower
is s, the higher is the degree of price stickiness. When s goes to innity, price is not sticky
and the actual market price is equal to the price given by the demand function.
The instantaneous prot function of rm i is
i(t) = qi(t)

p(t)  c  1
2
qi(t)

:
Therefore, the maximization problem of rm i is
max
qi(t)
Ji =
1Z
0
e tqi(t)

p(t)  c  1
2
qi(t)

dt; (4)
subject to (3), p(0) = p0 and p(t)  0 for all t 2 [0;1). The factor e t discounts future
gains, and the discount rate  is assumed to be constant and equal across rms.
We solve the di¤erential game using both the open-loop information structure where
rms choose their production plans at the initial date and stick to them for the whole
time horizon and the closed-loop memoryless information structure where rmsquantity
choices at any time depend on the initial and current levels of all state variables (here,
price).
According to Cellini and Lambertini (2004), the steady state levels of the price and
the individual output of a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjustments which are the
premerger solution of our problem at the open-loop Nash equilibrium are
3
pOL = A  nqOL ; qOL = (A  c)(+ s)
(1 + n)+ (2 + n)s
; (5)
and at the closed-loop Nash equilibrium are
pCL = A  nqCL ; qCL = (A  c)(+ ns)
s+ (1 + n)(+ ns)
: (6)
The corresponding single period prots are
OL =
(A  c)2(+ s)(+ 3s)
2 [(1 + n)+ (2 + n)s]2
; CL =
(a  c)2(+ ns)(+ (2 + n)s)
2 [s+ (1 + n)(+ ns)]2
:
The superscripts OL and CL indicate the open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium level of
a variable, respectively.
For later reference, let us also note that in the static game where the demand and cost
functions are specied by (1) and (2) in turn, the equilibrium prices when rms play à la
Cournot and à la Bertrand respectively are
pCN =
2A+ nc
n+ 2
; (7)
pBN =
A+ nc
n+ 1
: (8)
3 The merger equilibrium
In this section, we consider a horizontal merger of m rms (1 < m  n) where they act
collusively to maximize their discounted joint prots.2 n m rms stay outside the merger.
Hence, the di¤erential game becomes
max
qi
Jm =
1Z
0
e t
"
(p(t)  c)
mX
i=1
qi(t)  1
2
mX
i=1
q2i (t)
#
dt; i = 1; :::;m (9)
max
qj(t)
Jj =
1Z
0
e tqj(t)

p(t)  c  1
2
qj(t)

dt; j = m+ 1; :::; n (10)
subject to
dp(t)
dt
 _p(t) = s
(
A 
mX
i=1
qi(t) 
nX
j=m+1
qj(t)  p(t)
)
; (11)
2Given the convex cost function, it is optimal to produce with all m rms, and not to concentrate
production on one rm only.
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and to the initial conditions p(0) = p0 and p(t)  0.
qi(t)  0; i 2 f1; 2; :::;mg and qj(t)  0; j 2 fm+ 1; :::; ng denote, in turn, the output
level of an insider and an outsider. JM and Jj represent the problem of the merging rm
and outsiders, respectively.
According to (9), (10) and (11), the Hamiltonian functions of merging rms and out-
siders are
HM(t) = e t
(
(p(t)  c)
mX
i=1
qi(t)  1
2
mX
i=1
q2i (t) (12)
+i(t)s
"
A 
mX
i=1
qi(t) 
nX
j=m+1
qj(t)  p(t)
#)
;
Hj(t) = e
 t

qj(t)

p(t)  c  1
2
qj(t)

(13)
+j(t)s
"
A 
mX
i=1
qi(t) 
nX
j=m+1
qj(t)  p(t)
#)
;
where j(t) = j (t) e
t and i(t) = i (t) e
t and j (t) and i (t) are the co-state variables
associated with p(t).
3.1 Open-loop equilibrium
After the merger, at the open-loop Nash equilibrium, the steady state levels of the price
and the output of merging rm and outsiders are
pOLpost = A  qOLM   (n m) qOLO ;
qOLM = m (+ 2s) ; q
OL
O =  (+ s+ms) ;
where
 =
(A  c) (+ s)
(n+ 1) 2 + [2n+m (n m+ 2) + 3] s+ [n+m (n m+ 3) + 2] s2 :
The subscripts M and O indicate the equilibrium level of a variable for the merging rm
and an outsider and subscripts post refers to the equilibrium level the price after the
merger. Hence, the steady state equilibrium prots are as follows
OLM =
2m (+ 2s)2 (+ s+ 2ms)
2 (+ s)
; OLO =
2(+ 3s)(+ s+ms)2
2(+ s)
:
For the proof you can see Benchekroun (2003).
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3.2 Closed-loop equilibrium
Now, we look for the post-merger Nash equilibrium under the closed-loop strategies. The
outcome is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 At the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, the steady state levels of the price
and the output of merging rm and outsiders are
pCLpost = A  qCLM   (n m) qCLO ; (14)
qCLM = m (+ (n m+ 1) s)
 
+
 
m2  m+ n+ 1 s ; (15)
qCLO = (+ s (n+ 1))
 
+ (m2  m+ n)s ; (16)
where
 = (A  c) = (n+ 1) 2 +  n  m2  m+ 2n+ 3+ 2 s
+
 
(n+ 1)
 
m2n mn+ n2 + n+ 1 m4 +m3 s2
which yields the steady state equilibrium prots
CLM =
1
2
2m(+ (n m+ 1) s)(+ (n+m+ 1) s)(+ (m2  m+ n+ 1)s)2
CLO =
1
2
2(+ s (n+ 1))2
 
+ (m2  m+ n)s  + (m2  m+ n+ 2)s
Proof. Taking the rst-order conditions w.r.t. qi(t) and qj(t) and using (12) and (13), in
turn, we have
@HM(t)
@qi(t)
= p (t)  c  qi(t)  i(t)s = 0; (17)
@Hj(t)
@qj(t)
= p (t)  c  qj(t)  j(t)s = 0; (18)
which yields the optimal closed-loop output for, respectively, the insiders and outsiders as
follows
qCLi (t) =

p (t)  c  i(t)s if p (t) > c+ i(t)s;
0 otherwise,
(19)
qCLj (t) =

p (t)  c  j(t)s if p (t) > c+ j(t)s;
0 otherwise.
(20)
The adjoint equations for the optimum are
 @H
M(t)
@p(t)
 
nX
j=m+1
@HM(t)
@qj(t)
@qCLj (t)
@p(t)
=
@i(t)
@t
  i(t); (21)
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 @Hj(t)
@p(t)
 
nX
k=m+1;
k 6=j
@Hj(t)
@qk(t)
@qCLk (t)
@p(t)
 m
mX
i=1
@Hj(t)
@qi(t)
@qCLi (t)
@p(t)
=
@i(t)
@t
  i(t): (22)
The transversality conditions are
lim
t!1
i(t):p (t) = 0; lim
t!1
j(t):p (t) = 0:
From (19) and (20) we obtain
@qCLj (t)
@p(t)
=
@qCLk (t)
@p(t)
=
@qCLi (t)
@p(t)
= 1: (23)
The di¤erence between the closed-loop and open-loop solutions is due to these terms
in equations (21) and (22) which are set equal to zero in the open-loop case.3 That
is, when rms play closed-loop strategies, each rm inserts her information regarding
the dependency of the other rms supply policy on the current market price into the
adjoint equation. The additional terms in the co-state equations (21) and (22) imply the
strategic interaction among rms, which are not considered by denition in the open-loop
solution. Furthermore, the adjoint equation of merging rm (21) is di¤erent from the
adjoint equation of an outsider (22). Since there is a cartel inside the group of insiders,
there is no strategic interaction among insiders while looking at (22) we recognize that in
addition to the strategic interaction between each outsider and any of the insiders there
are strategic interactions among outsiders.
Di¤erentiating (12) and (13) w.r.t. the co-state variables and using (23), equations
(21) and (22) can be rewritten as
 
mX
i=1
qi(t) + i(t)s 
nX
j=m+1
i(t)s =
@i(t)
@t
  i(t);
 qj(t) + j(t)s 
nX
k=m+1;
k 6=j
j(t)s m
mX
i=1
j(t)s =
@i(t)
@t
  i(t):
Inducing symmetry assumption, we obtain
@(t)
@t
=  mq(t) + [(m  n+ 1) s+ ] (t); (24)
3In the open-loop solution, the adjoint equations for the optimum for insiders and outsiders are as
follows, respectively
 @H
M (t)
@p(t)
=  
mP
i=1
qi(t) + i(t)s =
@i(t)
@t
;  @Hj(t)
@p(t)
=  qj(t) + j(t)s =
@j(t)
@t
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@(t)
@t
=  q(t) +   m2   n+m+ 2 s+ (t): (25)
Di¤erentiating (19) and (20) w.r.t. time and using (24) and (25) we nd
dq(t)
dt
=
dp (t)
dt
   mq(t) + [(m  n+ 1) s+ ] (t) s; (26)
dq(t)
dt
=
dp (t)
dt
   q(t) +   m2   n+m+ 2 s+ (t) s: (27)
Using (11), (19) and (20) where a symmetry assumption is introduced for an individual
rm output inside the group of insiders and also the group of outsiders, we can rewrite
(26) and (27) as follows
dq(t)
dt
= sA+ [(n m  1) s  ] c+ [(m  n) s+ ] p (t)
 s (n m) q(t) + [(n m  1) s  ] q(t);
dq(t)
dt
= sA+ c
 
m2 + n m  2 s    smq(t)
+
  m2   n+m+ 1 s+  p(t) +  m2   1 s   q(t):
dq(t)=dt = 0, dq(t)=dt = 0 and dp(t)=dt = 0, which are linear relationships between p, q
and q, yield the steady state of the system and the equilibrium point is a saddle with (14),
(15) and (16).
Keeping symmetry assumption in the group of insiders as well as the group of outsiders,
the two groups are necessarily asymmetric. Because essentially there is a cartel among
insiders while the rest of the market behave like dynamic Cournot competitors. These
asymmetries between the two groups are not only with respect to the rst-order conditions
and controls but in particular with respect to the co-state amounts. By construction,
the list of co-state values entails that the shadow price attached by any outsider will
be systematically di¤erent from the shadow price attached to the price dynamics by one
of the insiders. Considering (17) and (18), we can rewrite the FOCs for outsiders as
(t) = p (t)  c  q(t)=s and insiders as (t) = p (t)  c  q(t)=s. Then, taking into account
the fact that the output level of an outsider is greater than the output level of a single
insider, we have the following consequence
Corollary 1 The shadow price of an insider is greater than an outsiders
 
(t) > (t)

.
This entails that the proportional change of merging rms prot, on account of alter-
ation in the state equation, is more than that of an outsider.
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4 The incentive to merge
After nding the post-merger equilibrium, we are able to investigate the protability of
a horizontal merger with price dynamics in a Cournot competition. First, we gure out
the minimum percentage of insiders which is required to make the merger protable in
the case of instantaneous price adjustment. Then, we evaluate merger protability in the
space (m; s=) for a given initial population of rms to perceive the role of price stickiness
in stimulating merger incentives.
To deal with the above mentioned issues, we will consider the di¤erence between the
post-merger prot of the merging rm and sum of the individual prots of the insiders
before the merger which has to be positive as a condition for merger protability. That
is, in an n-rm industry, m rms will nd it protable to merge if and only if the merger
protability condition OLM  MOL > 0 (open-loop) or CLM   mCL > 0 (closed-loop)
holds.
When the speed of price adjustment goes to innity, Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2001)
and Benchekroun (2003) showed that when rms use feedback strategies mergers are always
protable irrespective of the number of insiders whereas we will show that it is not the case
for the closed-loop (memoryless) and open-loop strategies and a su¢ cient proportion of
rms is required. However, as compared to the open-loop, this proportion is very di¤erent
when rms play closed-loop. Figure 1 illustrates corresponding results graphically. From
this graph we can see that as the population of rms in the industry increases, the minimum
proportion of rms that makes the merger protable has a decreasing trend under the
closed-loop strategies while it has an increasing trend under the open-loop strategies.
Thus, we can argue that it is much more easier to maintain collusion among insiders in
the closed-loop equilibrium than the open-loop. This di¤erence is due to the fact that
"open-loop" and "closed-loop" refer to the two di¤erent information structures. In both
cases, everybody operate under the complete information but, as it is explained in previous
section in detail, under the closed-loop information structure rms explicitly incorporate
strategic interactions in the co-state equations while in the open-loop they do not.
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Figure 1: The lowest proportion of rms to be merged to make a protable
merger for the instantaneous price adjustment.
6
-
m
n
n0
OL
CL
In gure 2, the region of parameters s and  for which merger of m rms is protable is
represented by means of two dividing curves under the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria
in a ten-rm industry. We provide this graph to show that in cases where price is too sticky,
merger would be to the benet of merging rm even if its market share is low.
In this gure we can see that in the open-loop equilibrium when the speed of adjustment
goes to innity, merger must involve at least eight insiders to become protable. As it is
investigated by Fershtman and Kamien ([8], pp. 1159-1161), in the limit where s tends to
innity, the open-loop equilibrium (5) coincides with the static Cournot Nash equilibrium
(7) and we know that in the static Cournot model merger is disadvantageous to the merging
rm unless the market share of merging rm is su¢ ciently high (at least 80%). However,
in the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, as this gure clearly displays, merger of four rms
in ten-rm industry is always protable which is due to the closed-loop rule properties
explained earlier.
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Figure 2: Merger protability in the space (m; s=) for n = 10
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For a given level of discount rate, as the population of insiders decreases, the speed of
price adjustment must reduce as well in order to make the merger protable. This means
that for a given rate of discounting, merger incentives are higher when the speed of price
adjustment is slower. When price adjusts very slowly, the equilibrium prices both under
the open-loop (5) and closed-loop (6) information structure approach to the competitive
equilibrium price of the static game in which rms set price equal to marginal cost and
as s tends to zero, the equilibrium prices at the steady state, in either cases, are given by
(A+nc)=(n+1) which is precisely the competitive price as dened in (8).4 In games where
rms behave like Bertrand competitors mergers are protable because any price increase
by insiders will be followed by a price increase from outsiders and in equilibrium prices
in the industry are raised and this is to the benet of all rms. Incentive to merge with
Bertrand competition is extensively discussed by Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
4Also, the features of the feedback equilibrium in the limit where the discount rate tends to innity is
looked into by Fershtman and Kamien ([8], pp. 1159) and they demonstrated that in such circumstances,
the feedback equilibrium coincides with the Bertrand equilibrium of the static game.
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5 Conclusions
Taking a di¤erential game approach with sticky prices in an oligopolistic industry, we have
analyzed the consequences of horizontal mergers both in the open-loop and the closed-loop
solutions. In view of the fact that we would like to concentrate on the incentives to merge
that are generated by price dynamics, it is assumed that there is no cost e¢ ciency in our
model. It turns out that for a given amount of interest rate, merger incentives are higher
when the mechanism governing price adjustment is very slow. When price is very sticky,
the dynamic Cournot equilibrium prices approach to the competitive equilibrium price of
the static game in which rms set price equal to marginal cost. Firms would like to play
the correct Cournot equilibrium but they cannot because price adjusts very slowly and in
this aggressive environment they have an incentive to decrease the number of competitors
through merger in order to make a slight correction in output setting mistakes and recover
what they are losing.
Moreover, our results suggest that the relative number of rms that is required for
merger to be protable has two divergent trends under open-loop and closed-loop informa-
tion structures. When rms play cloesd-loop, it is a decreasing function of the population
of rms in the industry while for the open-loop it is the opposite. Accordingly, the larger
the relevant information set, the higher is the possibility of collusion between rms. Given
that pushing competition has a contradictory outcome under the closed-loop rule, it is
worthwhile for policy makers and antitrust authorities to consider as well the nature of
competition in the industry.
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